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The advanced capitalist economies are experiencing the worst economic 
crisis since the Great Depression. The depth of  the crisis as well as the 
ongoing hegemony of  neoliberalism requires explanation. This paper 
argues a process of  ﬁnancialization has given rise to a ﬁnance-dominated 
regime of  accumulation and that the crisis should be understood as the 
outcome of  the process of  ﬁnancialization and the polarization of  income 
distribution. The ﬁrst part may be less controversial: ﬁnancial deregulation 
is widely recognized as a cause of  the crisis. We go further in arguing that 
ﬁnancialization represents a profound transformation of  the capitalist 
accumulation regime. The second part may be more innovative. We argue 
40 E�������� S����������
that the polarization of  income distribution is a root cause of  the crisis in the 
sense that it contributed to the imbalances that erupted in the crisis.
Epstein has described “ﬁnancialization [as] the increasing role of  ﬁnancial 
motives, ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancial actors and ﬁnancial institutions in the 
operation of  the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005, 
p. 3). This deﬁnition may lack precision, but it gives a good impression of  the 
ubiquity and pervasiveness of  ﬁnancialization and is thus a good starting 
point. We will maintain that ﬁnancialization has micro economic as well 
as macro aspects. In other words: ﬁnancialization has transformed how 
economic actors (households, workers, ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions) 
perceive of  themselves, what goals they pursue and what constraints they face. 
The macroeconomic transformations are no less profound: economies are 
increasingly driven by movements in the prices of  real estate and ﬁnancial 
assets and by the burden of  servicing ﬁnancial obligations, i.e. debt. And a 
change in the credit rating of  a countries debt can horrify politicians and 
wreck public ﬁnances. 
In discussing the ﬁnance-dominated accumulation regime, we highlight 
a further aspect: ﬁnancialization, much like other incarnations of  capitalism 
creates its own dynamics of  differentiation. Rather than analyzing the 
United States (or United Kingdom) experience as the purest, most advanced 
form of  ﬁnancialization, we emphasize that their development is part of  a 
differential process. Other countries’ experiences are of  empirical as well 
as of  theoretical interest (Becker, 2002).
In a nutshell, our story is the following. Financialization has increased the 
size and the fragility of  the ﬁnancial sector (much like Keynes and Minsky 
would have predicted). How this impacted on the global accumulation 
regime turns out to be quite complex. Neoliberalism has led to a shift 
in power relations between capital and labour. As a consequence income 
distribution has shifted sharply in favour of  capital. Socially this has left 
working class households struggling to keep up with consumption norms. 
Economically it had a potentially dampening effect on domestic demand 
(as demand is wage led in the world as a whole). Different countries have 
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developed different strategies of  coping with this shortfall of  demand. 
Everywhere households (including working class households) have 
experienced rising debt levels. In Anglo-Saxon countries debt-driven 
consumption turned into the main demand engine, usually in conjunction 
with real estate bubbles. Financial deregulation has an international as well 
as a domestic dimension. The liberalization of  capital ﬂows has allowed 
countries to temporarily sustain large current account deﬁcits –as long 
as ﬁnancial markets were willing to provide the corresponding capital 
inﬂows. Indeed, for many countries (in particular developing economies), 
boom-bust cycles driven by capital inﬂows and currency crises have been the 
most important feature of  the ﬁnance-dominated accumulation regime. As 
countries have been able to run substantial current account surpluses (while 
others run deﬁcits) international ﬁnancial liberalization has created a new 
scope for different trajectories across countries. A second group of  countries 
has relied on export-driven growth (and subdued domestic consumption) and 
run substantial current account surpluses. Two key sources of  the crisis, 
debt-driven consumption and international imbalances, are thus linked to 
the interactions of  ﬁnancial liberalization and the polarization of  income 
distribution.1 
The remainder of  this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives 
an overview of  the present crisis and its metamorphoses. Section 3 
visit debates around ﬁnancialization and the nebulous borders between 
neoliberalism and ﬁnancialization. Section 4 summarizes changes brought 
by ﬁnancialization for the ﬁnancial sector, businesses and households. 
Section 5 discusses changes in income distribution, ﬁnancial globalisation 
and the characteristics of  the ﬁnance-dominated accumulation regime. 
In particular it highlights the emergence of  two different growth models. 
Section 6 discusses the channels by which income inequality has contributed 
to the crisis and section 7 concludes.
1  Horn et al. (2009) and Hein (2011a) develop a very similar argument. 
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T�� ������ 2007-2011 
In mid 2006 house prices in the United States started to decline. With 
hindsight, that marks the beginning of  the crisis, even if  it attracted little 
attention at the time. Rapidly rising house prices, and the mortgage lending 
that came with it, had been the basis of  a boom driven by credit-ﬁnanced 
consumption and construction investment in the United States. But this 
section will give a brief  overview of  the unfolding of  the crisis itself.
The crisis broke out in a seemingly obscure niche of  the United States 
ﬁnancial system: the subprime market, which is the market on which 
derivatives on low-quality mortgage credit; thus the initial name of  the crisis 
as subprime crisis. This is a rather small segment of  the overall mortgage 
market, though it accounted for a substantial part of  the credit growth 
in the years before the crisis. As subprime credit is, by deﬁnition, of  
low quality, it was the natural ﬁeld for the kind of  ﬁnancial engineering, 
securitization, which was supposed to reduce risk. What was going on 
here was the extreme form of  what happened on a much broader scale 
in the entire mortgage industry. In August 2007 the crisis spilt over into 
the interbank market, where banks lend to each other, usually very short 
term. The interbank market is at the very centre of  the modern ﬁnancial 
system. Interest rose to more than one percentage points above that of  
government bonds. This increase in the risk premium of  lending meant 
that banks did not trust each other. And rightly so, as it turned out. Central 
banks reacted quickly and pumped billions (of  dollars and Euros) into the 
market to maintain liquidity.
However, while the interbank market stabilized the crisis evolved. In 
spring 2008 Bear Stearns, one of  the leading investment banks, was bankrupt 
and could only be sold with the Federal Reserve (FED) guaranteeing some 
20 billion US$ worth of  assets. A ﬁrst (small) ﬁscal stimulus packet was 
implemented in the United States, but the impact on the real economy 
outside the United States was limited. In August/September 2008 the crisis 
turned into a full scale ﬁnancial crisis –and it did so with a bang: Lehman 
Brothers, one of  Wall Street’s leading investment banks, went bankrupt. 
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The end of  the world (or at least of  big ﬁnance) as we knew it, seemed to 
have arrived. Interest rates soared (interest spread rose to several percentage 
points) and liquidity froze. 
Again economic policy reacted. The principles of  neoliberal free-market 
economics were suspended for a few weeks. Central banks provided more 
liquidity, but that proved insufﬁcient to stabilize markets. Governments 
had to intervene directly: AIG, an insurance ﬁrm that had insured huge 
volumes of  credit derivates, was taken over by the state as were Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the two state-sponsored mortgage reﬁnancing giants. 
Within a few weeks the recapitalization ﬁnancial institutions and massive 
guarantees for interbank credits became mainstream economic policy. 
Recapitalization meant that governments effectively nationalized (fully or 
partly) ﬁnancial institutions –but governments abstained from interfering 
with the management banks despite obvious management failures. In late 
October 2008 an European Union summit issued a statement that no 
systemically important ﬁnancial institutions would be allowed to fail– a 
capitalism without bankruptcies (of  big banks) was declared!
By fall 2008 the ﬁnancial crisis had turned into a full blown economic crisis. 
Income in most developed countries shrank at a speed not seen since the 
1930s (in most countries by around 5%). And it not only hit those countries 
that had experienced property bubbles, but also countries like Germany 
and Japan (where property prices had been practically ﬂat) and it spread 
to the emerging countries. Eastern European countries were particularly 
bad hit, with the Baltic countries suffering Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
declines by around 20%. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to 
be called in to save Hungary, Pakistan and the Baltic states. But the most 
conspicuous symbol of  the downturn was certainly the fall of  General 
Motors (GM): once the world’s largest ﬁrm and employer, it now had to be 
rescued by the state. 
While complete meltdown seemed imminent in fall 2008, in the course of  
spring 2009 it became clear that the –historically unprecedented– scale 
of  government intervention had prevented outright collapse. A cascade of  
bank breakdowns could be prevented by rescue packages that amounted 
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to 80% of  GDP in the United States and the United Kingdom (UNCTAD, 
2009, Table 1.8) and by the FED expanding its balance sheet by a trillion 
US$, mostly by acquiring assets that it would not have touched in normal 
times. Risk premia remained elevated, banks were making phenomenal 
losses, unemployment started rising, but normality of  a sort returned. 
And, apparently, the pressure to reform the system had receded. Earlier 
declarations of  a fundamental restructuring of  the ﬁnancial system had 
been forgotten and the debate on reform turned into specialists’ debate 
into technicalities, with all but private bankers and central bankers being 
excluded from the decision making circles. The arrogance of  the ﬁnancial 
elite, however, is best captured by the fact that, despite of  the obvious 
disaster in ﬁnance, bankers’ bonuses are back to pre-crisis levels. 
But the normality that was about to restore itself  was not quite the 
normality of  before the crisis. After all, the crisis was by no means over. 
Indeed, for large parts of  the population, it only had begun, when for the 
bankers it was almost over. Production fell and unemployment rose. In 
the United States foreclosures were rising. People lost their jobs and their 
homes. And there was another devastating effect of  the crisis: budget 
deﬁcits were increasing, surpassing 10% of  GDP in many cases. So in the 
course of  2009 the crisis thus took its next turn: a ﬁscal crisis. This has been 
lingering for several months, but its most prominent victim in winter 2009-
2010 was Greece and with it the Euro system. 
In January-February 2010 Greece faced punitive interest rates on its 
(public) debt issues. Greece had fudged public debt statistics (with the help 
of  leading Wall Street banks) and now had difﬁculties reﬁnancing its debt. 
Indeed, what had been exposed was fundamental ﬂaw in the construction 
of  the Euro system. With exchange rates frozen, the southern countries had, 
despite much lower inﬂation since adopting the Euro, slowly, but steadily 
lost competitiveness to Germany and its economic satellites. Germany’s 
net exports (mostly to other Euro countries) amounted to more than 5% of  
GDP. This was achieved by wage suppression and, consequently, low inflation 
rates (Lapavitsas et al., 2010). The Euro area had no instruments to deal 
with internal imbalances, other than trusting labour market ﬂexibility to 
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adjust the price levels. Greece received a € 110 billion loan from the newly 
instituted European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
While it was relatively simple to blame the Greek crisis on irresponsible 
ﬁscal policy the structural problems of  the Euro area were illustrated 
by the Irish crisis shortly thereafter. Ireland had government surpluses 
before the crisis, but still needed a huge rescue package (€ 85 billion, more 
than half  of  Irish GDP). Like in Greece, the rescue package is really a rescue 
package for the European ﬁnancial sector rather than for states. Ireland 
had experienced an enormous real estate bubble that burst and effectively 
bankrupted its banks. Because of  the bank bailouts, Irish debt soared by 
40%-points of  GDP from 2007 to 2010. Literally all of  the obligations of  
the Irish banking system were guaranteed, which led to an angry article by 
Eichengreen (2010).
The Euro crisis is far from over (indeed at the time of  writing it seems 
that Italy is engulfed next) and in the United States economics news 
indicates stagnation. What is somewhat euphemistically called ‘deleveraging’ 
has begun. Meantime ﬁscal policy has switched into reverse in all countries. 
What is more, in several cases (most notably the United Kingdom and 
Greece) it is becoming clear that the battle cry of  sound ﬁscal policy is 
used to cover a re-structuring of  the role of  the state: a second wave of  
neoliberalism!
F���������������: �������, ������, �����������
Financialization has profoundly transformed advanced economies. The 
term used to summarize a broad set of  changes in the relation between 
the ‘ﬁnancial’ and ‘real’ sector which give greater weight than heretofore to 
ﬁnancial actors or motives. The debate on ﬁnancialization draws a range of  
different theoretical and methodological approaches and is thus difﬁcult to 
summarize.2 Cultural economists have highlighted the incompleteness and 
2  One of  the ﬁrst prominent works to use the term ﬁnancialization was Arrighi (1994) who identiﬁed 
long waves of  economic development in global capitalism that involve hegemonic and geographic 
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contradictions of  the discursive strategies of  ﬁnancialization (Froud, Johal, 
Leaver and Williams, 2006), while macroeconomists have tried to identify 
the conditions for viable growth regimes; economic sociologists have 
argued that (ﬁnancial) markets have to be constructed by speciﬁc actors 
with speciﬁc interest (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003), while post-Keynesian 
economists have highlighted the fragile nature of  ﬁnance-led growth (see 
Ertürk et al., 2008, for a useful collection of  seminal contributions and 
Stockhammer, 2010, as a short survey).3 
Before we turn to speciﬁc changes for different economic actors, let 
us highlight a common theme of  the transformation brought about by 
ﬁnancialization: actors increasingly perceive of  themselves like ﬁnancial 
institutions manipulating their balance sheets, as if  they were managing a 
portfolio of  assets. They compare relative rates of  return and want to be 
able to trade in liquid assets. This represents an increasing commodiﬁcation 
of  social relations. These transformations have different implications for 
different sectors in the economy: ﬁnancial institutions have shifted towards 
liquid assets; within ﬁrms this represents a shift in power relations from 
labour to capital, but the rule of  capital has taken a new guise, that of  
shareholder value; for households, in particular working class households the 
transformation dissolved previous notions of  working class consciousness 
and opened new ways for exploitation. 
Let us illustrate these last points by quoting from Foucault’s summary 
of  labour in neoliberal analysis: “An income is quite simply the product or 
return on a capital. Conversely, we call ‘capital’ everything that in one way 
or another can be source of  future income. Consequently, if  we accept on 
this basis that the wage is an income, then the wage is therefore the income of  
shifts. While the upswings of  these long waves are characterized by increased manufacturing and 
trade activity, in the downturns a process of  ﬁnancialization occurs: the leading power had initially 
established a competitive advantage in terms of  production, but it shifts towards ﬁnancial activities 
as its growth model gets exhausted and other players catch up. In contrast to Arrighi most of  the 
recent debate uses the term more narrowly to refer to the period since the 1970s.
3  For contributions on the macroeconomics of  ﬁnancialization see Boyer (2000), Stockhammer 
(2005/06), Dutt (2006), van Treeck (2009) and Hein (2011b).
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a capital” (Foucault, 2008, p. 224). The worker becomes “an entrepreneur 
of  himself ” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Bowles (1975) had offered asimilar 
analysis of  the ideological content of  human capital theory earlier.
This represents an important shift in the ideological justiﬁcation of  
capitalism. While, according to Marx’ analysis of  commodity fetishism, 
the wage contract appears as ‘fair’ as it is agreed-up exchange of  labour 
for money (Marx 1976, Chapters 1.4 and 6), it implicitly acknowledges 
the existence of  a working class. In Foucault’s analysis of  neoliberalism, the 
worker himself  becomes an entrepreneur. Modern capitalism isn’t just fair; 
we’re all capitalists now!
There are multiple overlaps between the concepts of  ﬁnancialization 
and that of  neoliberalism. Various (Marxist) authors have highlighted that 
ﬁnancialization is one of  the core parts of  neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; 
Glyn, 2006; Duménil and Lévy, 2004) and that proﬁts increasingly accrue 
in the form of  ﬁnancial incomes or in the forms of  capital gains. In this 
analysis neoliberalism is essentially the latest offensive of  capital to restore 
proﬁtability.
This may understimate the novelty of  neoliberalism. Already in the 
late 1970s Michel Foucault (2008) had suggested an interpretation of  
neoliberalism as a form of  governance by competitive subjectiﬁcation. Based on a 
careful reading of  the German ordo-liberal school and the United States-
Chicago School he argues that neoliberalism differs radically from classical 
liberalism in that it does not aim at liberating markets, but at creating 
markets and subordinating government activity under this goal. Markets 
do not spontaneously spring into being, but have to be constructed and 
maintained –by governments. Contrary to classical liberalism neoliberalism 
thus requires permanent and profound state intervention. 
Stockhammer and Ramskogler (2009) reached a similar conclusion 
based on an analysis of  recent economic policy and of  New Keynesian and 
Neo-Institutionalist developments in mainstream economics and call these 
developments enlightened neoliberalism. Many recent mainstream economics 
approaches differ from the old neoclassical general equilibrium theory not 
in their trust in the efﬁciency of  markets, but argue that they have to be 
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created and maintained rather than posited. The title of  the World Bank 
(2002)’s World Development Report 2002 encapsulates this approach: Building 
Institutions for Markets. 
Our approach in the following will make use of  the regulationist 
framework.4 Before proceeding, three clariﬁcations are in place. First, I 
am purposefully using the term regulationist ‘framework’ rather than 
regulationist ‘theory’ as the Regulation School, in my view, does not qualify 
as theory in the strong sense of  the word, i.e. as positing speciﬁc causal 
explanations of  a range of  social or economic phenomena. Rather I regard 
it as an ‘intermediate theory’ that offers a platform to analyze historically 
speciﬁc eras by encompassing socio-institutional as well as economic 
aspects and allows potentially for the (historically speciﬁc) integration 
of  (among others) Keynesian and Marxian arguments. In this view the 
theoretical scope of  Regulation Theory, is limited; its practical usefulness, 
however, has been undervalued since its boom in the 1980s. 
Second, we will use the term accumulation regime to describe the 
macroeconomic pattern of  phases of  capitalism, based on speciﬁc 
institutions settings or trajectories. The meaning of  accumulation requires 
some discussion. Regulation theory was originally (Aglietta, 1979) based on 
Marxian analysis. In Marxian analysis there is a certain ambiguity in the term 
accumulation as it can refer to the growth of  proﬁts or to the growth of  
capital stock (i.e. reinvested proﬁts). As we shall see ﬁnancialization drives 
a wedge between the two. One of  the features of  the ﬁnance-dominated 
accumulation regime is that there has been an increase in proﬁts while, at 
the same time, there is sluggish growth of  investment.
Third, our discussion will be structured by economic sectors instead 
of  following the standard Regulationist script of  the analysis of  the 
mode of  regulation and its institutional structures. This may reﬂect my 
4  Classical works of  the (French) Regulation Theory include Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1985) and Boyer 
(1990). There are similarities between the Regulation Theory and the (American) Social Structure 
of  Accumulation approach (Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1982; Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf, 
1983).
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macroeconomic interests, but it is mainly a device to highlight the effects 
of  ﬁnancialization. As any light also casts a shadow, this comes at a cost. 
Compared to a proper regulationist analysis the transformation of  the capital-
labour relation, the impact of  globalization and the changes in the state get 
insufﬁcient attention.5
T�������������� ������� ����� �� ����������������
Financialization was made possible by a series of  measures to deregulate 
the ﬁnancial sector and to liberalize international capital ﬂows. Many of  
these measures were themselves reactions to increasing activities on the 
part of  private agents to circumvent ﬁnancial regulation. This section aims to 
give an overview over how ﬁnancialization has affected different sectors 
of  the economy. In doing so, we highlight changes in the constraints as well 
as in the aims of  economic actors and we try to document differences across 
countries.
The ﬁnancial sector
Changes in the ﬁnancial sector have been quite dramatic. The ﬁrst set 
of  changes is about the actors and institutions, which make up the ﬁnancial 
sector. Non-bank ﬁnancial institutions ranging from insurance ﬁrms to 
investment funds, money market funds, hedge funds, private equity funds 
and special purpose vehicles have gained weight. Typically these institutions 
are much less regulated than banks, though, thanks to ﬁnancial innovation, 
they perform similar functions as banks and are thus often referred to as 
shadow banking system (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky, 2010). 
The shadow banking system has also been an engine for ﬁnancialization 
and in the form of  offshore ﬁnance parts of  it blatantly serve for tax 
evasion and money laundering (Shaxson, 2010). One important aspect of  
the emergence of  the shadow banking sector is ﬁnancial innovation, i.e. the 
5 Vidal (2010) offers an interpretation of  post-Fordism as Waltonism.
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development of  new ﬁnancial instruments that often helped to circumvent 
traditional banking regulation. Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky (2010) 
estimate that in the United States the shadow banking system is now larger 
than the regular banking sector (measured in terms of  assets). 
Within the banking sector there has been a shift towards fee-generating 
business rather than traditional banking that generates income as a result 
of  the interest differential between rates on deposits and on loans. Part of  
this has been the emergence of  what has been called the originate-and-
distribute model of  banking (in particular in the United States), where 
mortgages were quickly sold in the form of  asset backed securities. In 
terms of  lending, there has been a shift to lending to households rather 
than to ﬁrms. In particular mortgages are now by far the largest loan 
positions (Ertürk and Solari 2007, Lapavitsas, 2009). 
Supporters of  ﬁnancial deregulation have argued that ﬁnancialization 
will provide a superior way of  dealing with risk; e.g. securitization was 
supposed to slice risk into different parts (by means of  different securities) 
and allocate it to those who were best equipped to hold it. The ﬁnancial 
system would thus be more stable (e.g. IMF, 2006, p. 51) and society better 
off, a claim that sounds plainly embarrassing after the events of  the last 
years. In contrast Keynesians have long argued that ﬁnancial markets are 
intrinsically unstable and tend to generate endogenous boom-bust cycles 
(Minsky, 1986). More recently, they have highlighted conﬂicts of  interest 
and the dangers of  the belief  that risk could easily be sliced by means of  
looking at past correlations (Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005). 
There are long-standing differences between ﬁnancial systems across 
countries, that are often grouped into market-based and bank-based 
system (e.g Allen and Gale, 2000; Schaberg, 1999). While ﬁnancialization 
has increased the size of  ﬁnancial sectors (as measure by assets as well as 
by the proﬁts) in all countries, strong differences across countries persist e.g. 
in the size of  stock markets, banks and institutional investors (Davis, 2003), 
though in some areas the international activities of  ﬁnancial institutions 
may render these differences less important. The spread of  the subprime 
crisis to the balance sheet of  ﬁnancial institutions across the globe is a case 
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in point, though (national) banking regulation and governance did make a 
difference for how banks were affected (Beltratti and Stulz, 2009).
Non-ﬁnancial businesses
One of  the most important changes in the non-ﬁnancial business sector is 
due to the increased role of  shareholders. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) 
argue that a shift in management behaviour from ‘retain and reinvest’ to 
‘downsize and distribute’ has occurred. While there is broad agreement 
(in heterodox economics) that ﬁnancial motives and actors have become 
more important within ﬁrms, there is a subtle difference in interpretation. 
Firms could be the victims of  institutional investors; or shareholder value 
orientation could be a strategy of  increasing exploitation. Either way, it 
is clear that interest and dividend payments have increased (Duménil and 
Lévy, 2001; Crotty, 2003). However only for few countries, namely for the 
United States, are data readily available.
More formally, Stockhammer (2004) shows that an increase in 
shareholder power will modify the desired proﬁt-growth frontier for the 
ﬁrm and presents econometric evidence that ﬁnancialization may explain 
a substantial part of  the slowdown in accumulation. However, results vary 
widely across countries (strong effects in the United States and France, 
weak effects in Germany). Orhangazi (2008) ﬁnds evidence for this channel 
based on ﬁrm-level data for the United States. Onaran, Stockhammer 
and Graﬂ (2011) present econometric evidence for the negative effect of  
dividend and interest payments on investment.
A second change for investment behaviour has been in the economic 
environment that ﬁrms face. Volatility of  ﬁnancial markets has increased 
substantially in the course of  ﬁnancial deregulation. As a consequence ﬁrms 
face a higher degree of  uncertainty which may make physical investment 
projects less attractive. In particular volatility of  exchange rates seems to 
have had some effects on manufacturing investment. However, uncertainty 
is hard to measure and estimation results from the existing literature are 
not conclusive enough to suggest a clear order of  magnitude of  the effect 
(Carruth, Dickerson and Henley, 2000; Stockhammer and Graﬂ, 2011).
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The weak performance of  investment compared to proﬁts can be seen 
in ﬁgure 1. The decline in the investment-to-proﬁts ratio can be observed in 
all major economies, even if  the peak values differ across countries (the 
mean peaks in 1980). The measure of  operating surplus used in ﬁgure 1 is 
based on the National Accounts and thus a broad one that includes all non-
wage income. Part of  the reason for the declining trend in the investment 
operating surplus ratio is due to a change in the composition of  the operating 
surplus. Perhaps surprisingly stock market prices have very little effect on 
investment. Already in the early 1990s (Chirinko, 1993), most empirical 
economists would have agreed that share prices have little, if  any, effect 
on investment. In our view ﬁnancialization has had a dampening effect on 
business investment due to negative effects of  shareholder value orientation 
and increased uncertainty. 
F����� 1
Investment to operating surplus
Source: �����.
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Households
Financialization has increased the access of  households to credit, the most 
important form of  which has been mortgage credit, which typically makes 
up 80% of  household credit. In combination with real estate booms this 
has often led to credit-ﬁnanced consumption booms. 6 In the United States 
consumption expenditures have become the main driving force in GDP 
growth in the 1990s. Mainstream economists try to explain this increase 
in consumption assuming rational behaviour (in Anglo-Saxon countries). 
The falling saving rates were ﬁrst explained by a wealth effect due to the 
rise in the value of  ﬁnancial assets because of  the stock market boom. 
In the late 1990s a 5% marginal propensity to consume out of  ﬁnancial 
wealth was often quoted (with some more qualiﬁcation for European 
countries; e.g. Boone, Giorno and Richardson, 1998). The stock market 
crash in 2000, however, did not result in a slowdown in consumption 
growth. The unabated consumption boom in the United States was then 
explained by booming house prices. Residential property was now identiﬁed 
as the key source of  the wealth effect as is more frequently accepted as 
collateral. Case, Shiller and Quigley (2001), Catte, Girouard, Price and 
André (2004), and Girouard, Kennedy and André (2006) ﬁnd substantially 
higher marginal propensity to consume out of  property wealth than out 
of  ﬁnancial assets.7 
There are two areas of  disagreement between the mainstream 
economics and heterodox approaches regarding the analysis of  household 
6 There is an additional channel through which ﬁnancialization may have affected consumption 
expenditures. In many countries the pay-as-you-go pension systems are being reformed or have 
been questioned. Typically some version of  a capital-based system is envisioned in which households 
have to invest their savings (usually via funds) in the stock market. This should lead to an increase 
in savings as households have to put more aside for retirement. I am not aware that this channel 
has been investigated empirically. 
7  While there is substantial evidence for the United States (albeit based on a short period of  
observations!) to back up this story, the evidence on European economies was always much thinner. 
Typically the wealth effects estimated for European economies were not statistically signiﬁcant or 
much smaller.
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debt. First, the mainstream literature usually assumes that households 
rationally increased their debt ratios as their wealth increased. From 
a heterodox point of  view a substantial part of  the accumulated debt is 
due to households maintaining consumption levels that are unsustainable 
(and could therefore be considered irrational). As wages have stagnated in 
many countries consumption norms as represented in mass media have 
arguably increased, many households could have been driven into debt 
(Cynamon and Fazzari, 2009). The second major disagreement is about 
the role of  income distribution. Several heterodox authors have argued 
that the increase in household debt should be regarded as a substitute to 
increases in wages (Barba and Pivetti, 2009). While consumption norms 
have increased, wages have not to the same extent. Consequently working 
class households were driven into debt.
Household debt is difﬁcult to measure and international comparisons 
chronically suffer from deﬁciencies in comparability of  data due to different 
ﬁnancial institutions and practices in different countries. Table 1 reports a 
wide range of  debt to GDP ratios across countries. However most European 
countries have experienced rising debt ratios since 1995, though at quite 
different levels. While the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark 
have debt ratios similar to those of  the United States, most continental 
European countries have much lower levels. It is also clear, with hindsight, 
that strong increases in household debt ratios were driven by property 
bubbles (in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain).
Within the (OLD) European Union, debt levels have been rising most 
dramatically in the Mediterranean countries and in Ireland –exactly the 
group of  countries that is now experiencing the crisis (see table 1).
T�� �������-��������� ������������ ������
Changes in income distribution 
One of  the hall marks of  neoliberalism has been the polarization of  the 
distribution of  income. The shift in power from labour to capital is clearly 
reﬂected in wage developments. Wage shares have been falling across 
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Europe and in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The Anglo-Saxon countries have, however, witnessed a 
strong increase of  inequality in personal income distribution (Atkinson, 
Piketty and Saez, 2010). Arguably, the exorbitant management salaries 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries should be considered a form of  proﬁts 
rather than wages. Indeed, subtracting the top 1% of  wage earners from 
T���� 1
Household debt in percentage of ���
 2000 2008 2009
Change 
2000-2008
United States 70.21 96.35 96.34 26.13
United Kingdom 75.16 107.43 110.00 32.27
Ireland 114.26 124.93 114.26
Greece 19.83 55.29 57.24 35.46
Spain 54.22 88.06 89.88 33.84
Portugal 74.96 102.34 107.48 27.38
Italy 35.29 53.61 56.54 18.32
Germany 73.41 61.70 63.91 –11.71
Austria 47.13 55.04 56.92 7.91
Switzerland 74.76 77.70 82.08 2.94
France 47.46 64.56 69.46 17.10
Belgium 40.85 50.25 54.08 9.40
Netherlands 86.98 119.81 130.45 32.83
Bulgaria 4.32 35.07 50.06 30.75
Estonia 12.14 61.35 69.27 49.21
Latvia 7.08 48.65 53.88 41.57
Lithuania 2.11 35.46 42.09 33.35
Hungary 9.04 39.51 40.65 30.47
Poland 8.29 32.77 33.03 24.48
Romania 3.28 29.24 31.23 25.96
Slovakia 12.70 38.29 47.77 25.59
Note: Ireland 2001-2008.
Source: Eurostat, except the United States (ﬂows of funds).
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the United States wage share, a strong decline can be observed. Based 
(consumer price index-adjusted) data available from the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008), median weekly 
wages in the United States have grown by a mere 2.8% from 1980 to 2005, 
the bottom quartile of  wages fell by 3.1% and the top10% increased by 21 
per cent.
While mainstream economics tends to identify the role of  technological 
change has been the main cause of  the decline in the wage share and 
that globalization has been a secondary cause (IMF, 2007a; European 
Commission, 2007), political economy approaches tend to highlight the 
ﬁnancial globalization, trade globalization and the decline in union density. 
Rodrik (1998), Harrison (2002), and Jayadev (2007) econometric evidence for 
the effects of  capital controls and capital mobility on income distribution. 
Stockhammer (2009) ﬁnds for oecd countries that ﬁnancial globalization, 
trade globalization and the decline in union density have been the main forces 
behind the falling wage share. International Labour Organization (ILO, 
2008) argues that ﬁnancial globalization has contributed to the decline in 
the wage share, but does not provide econometric evidence. Onaran (2009) 
shows that ﬁnancial crisis have long-lasting distributional effects for several 
developing countries.
What are the likely macroeconomic effects of  this redistribution on 
aggregate demand? From a Kaleckian point of  view, one would expect a 
dampening effect on aggregate demand. As wage incomes are typically 
associated with higher consumption propensities than proﬁt incomes, this 
ought to lead to a decrease in the consumption share. Stockhammer, Onaran 
and Ederer (2009) ﬁnd a saving differential of  around 0.4 for the Euro area.8 
Given that wage shares have declined by some 10% points since 1980, 
consumption shares ought to have declined by some 4% points (of  GDP) 
over this period due to changes in income distribution. The background 
8  This value is in line with comparable studies for other groups of  countries (Naastepad and Storm, 
2006/07; Hein and Vogel, 2008). 
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for macroeconomic developments in the neoliberal era is one of  potentially 
stagnant demand. 
International capital ﬂows
For many countries, in particular in the developing world, the main 
experience of  ﬁnancialization has been that of  exchange rate crises: Latin 
America in the 1980s and again in 1994, South-east Asia in 1997-1998. 
Typically these crises were preceded by periods of  strong capital inﬂows 
and were triggered by a sudden reversal of  capital ﬂows (Reinhart and 
Reinhart, 2008). All of  them have led to severe recessions (at times with 
double digit declines in real GDP). The European Monetary System (EMS) 
crisis 1992-1993 also shook developed economies and it led European 
countries to speed up monetary uniﬁcation and introduce a common 
currency, the Euro. At ﬁrst, the Euro appears to have been a success. Not 
only was the new currency accepted by the public. It also substantially 
decreased inﬂation and (real) interest rates in the former soft-currency 
countries. However, since inﬂation differentials persist across European 
countries, there have been creeping changes in real exchange rates that 
have accumulated over the years. Real exchange rates have diverged 
since the introduction of  the Euro. Germany has devalued by more than 
20% in real terms vis a vis Portugal, Spain, Ireland or Greece since 1999 and, 
unsurprisingly these countries have had large current account deﬁcits 
(whereas Germany had large surpluses). Rather than preventing internal 
imbalances, the Euro system has changed the nature of  the ensuing 
crisis: Rather than an exchange rate crisis, the imbalances now lead to a 
sovereign debt crisis in a situation where  the affected country has neither 
the possibility to devalue its currency nor does it have a central bank of  its 
own that could rescue its banks or ﬁnance its government. 
When politicians like Jacques Delors pushed for the introduction of  the 
Euro, what they had in mind was the creation of  a European state. While 
they have not succeeded in this, they have come rather close to destroying 
some of  the old nation states. Monetary uniﬁcation has thus in an ironic 
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way politicized the crisis while at the same time there is no European polity 
to debate the crisis.
The ﬂaw of  the Euro system is basically the following: There is a 
common monetary policy and ﬁscal policy is severely restricted. Exchange 
rate realignments are by deﬁnition not available to adjust to divergences 
across the Euro zone. So how can countries adjust? Basically through wage 
moderation. But this fails to work in practice. First, labour markets simply 
are not as ﬂexible as economic textbooks and European Union treaties 
would like them to be. Second, the adjustment via labour markets has a clear 
deﬂationary bias –the country with the current account deﬁcit will have to 
adjust and it has to adjust by wage restraint and disinﬂation. However, as 
overall inﬂation is limited to two percent, any country that seriously wants 
to improve competitiveness would have to go through an extended period 
of  deﬂation, which would require mass unemployment and falling wages. 
The present model requires that the deﬁcit countries restrain inﬂation 
and growth whereas the surplus countries are allowed to proceed running 
surpluses (Stockhammer, 2011b). But beyond its failure to deliver stability, 
this arrangement also has severe distributional consequences. Simply put, 
under the present arrangement Greek wages have to fall, but German wages 
do not have to rise. The system worked badly enough during the good times 
(in particular for the working classes), it’s proving lethal in bad times.
International imbalances in trade balances (and the corresponding 
capital ﬂows) are widely recognized as having played an important role in the 
building up of  the bubble in the United States. Capital ﬂows have provided 
vast amounts of  capital in search of  yield in US$ assets. These they found 
in various derivatives based on mortgage and commercial credit, thereby 
fuelling the credit-ﬁnanced consumption boom. However, we want to 
highlight a more structural feature of  ﬁnancial globalization: it has increased 
the potential for different developments across countries –if  only as long 
as international ﬁnancial markets remain calm. Financial liberalization and 
globalization have allowed countries to run larger current account deﬁcits, 
provided that they can attract the corresponding capital inﬂows. Figure 2 
plots the standard deviation of  the current account as a ratio to GDP (for 
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OECD countries) as a measure of  international imbalances. This shows that 
international imbalances have increased substantially since the mid 1980s.9 
Two things are remarkable about ﬁgure 2. First, imbalances in the early 2000s 
were above the levels of  the mid 1970s when the oil price shock gave rise to 
strong changes in current accounts across many countries; second the rise 
in international imbalance has been gradually building up since 1980. 
F����� 2
Standard deviation of the current account as percentage 
of ��� across ���� countries
9  As our measure only includes OECD countries China as well as some other South-East Asian 
countries that run substantial current account surpluses are not included. Our measure thus 
underestimates the full extent of  international imbalances. 
Source: �����.
The regime of fragile and slow accumulation
The debate on ﬁnancialization is fuelled by the perception that ﬁnance 
is increasingly dominating real activity, with the exact meaning of  this 
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statement often being hard to pin down. However, there is ample evidence 
that ﬁnancial activity has grown faster than real activity (as measured for 
example by GDP). For example, in the United States stock market 
capitalization has increased from 58% of  GDP in 1988 to 163% in 1999. 
The rise in stock market turnover is even more spectacular, rising from 
33% (of  GDP) in 1988 to 383% in 2008 (according to the World Bank 
Financial Structure Data Set). The ratio of  ﬁnancial and international 
proﬁts to total corporate proﬁts has risen from just above 12% in 1948 to 
a peak at 53% in 2001 (Bureau of  Economic Analysis, National Income 
and Product Accounts, Table 6.16B-D). Finally, ﬁnancialization has come 
with a dramatic increase in debt levels across different sectors. Figure 3 
shows the debt of  households, businesses and the ﬁnancial sector (as a ratio 
to GDP). While the business sector has increased its debt from 52% of  GDP 
(in 1976) to 77% (2009), household debt has increased from 45% (1976) to 
96% (2009), with a clear acceleration in the early 2000s. Most spectacularly, 
the debt of  the ﬁnancial sector has increased from 16 to 111 per cent 
(2009).10 The popular perception of  the increasing role of  ﬁnance is clearly 
substantiated by economic data: activity of  ﬁnancial markets has increased 
faster than real activity; ﬁnancial proﬁts make up an increasing share of  
total proﬁts; and households as well as the ﬁnancial sector are taking on a 
lot more debt. 
While there is evidence for a consumption boom in the United States 
(and previously for limited periods in some developing countries), for 
continental European countries one does not ﬁnd the strong evidence 
of  a consumption boom (related with a property price bubble) –despite 
the fact that household debt levels increased substantially.11 Investment 
10 These ﬁgures refer to gross debt. Typically debt will be used to acquire assets. The difference between 
the value of  the assets and gross debt is net debt. It is useful to look at gross debt as the valuation 
of  assets that may at times change dramatically as happened in 2008-2009, whereas the nominal 
value of  debt is ﬁxed.
11 However, given that income distribution has changed at the expense of  labour, which should 
have decreased consumption ratios, it is plausible that debt-driven consumption has also fuelled 
demand in Europe to some extent.
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performance has been weak. In particular rising proﬁts have not translated 
into rising investment. Presumably (but hardly conclusively) this is related 
to shareholder value orientation and increased uncertainty due to volatile 
ﬁnancial markets. The liberalization of  capital ﬂows has relaxed current 
account constraints on countries and led to volatile exchange rates and 
frequent ﬁnancial crises.
Overall the effects of  ﬁnancialization thus give rise to a ﬁnance-dominated 
accumulation regime that is one of  slow and fragile accumulation. There are 
two related reasons to expect the ﬁnance-dominated accumulation regime 
to come with more volatility in output growth (and other macroeconomic 
variables). First, macroeconomic shocks from the ﬁnancial sector have 
become more severe and more frequent. There is ample evidence that 
ﬁnancial markets generate highly volatile prices. Overshooting is well 
F����� 3
Debt of Households, businesses and ﬁnancial sectors 
(as ratio to ���), the United States
Source: ��� Flow of Funds, Table D.3 Credit Market Debt Outstanding by Sector; House-
hold, business and ﬁnancial debt are the total debt outstanding by households, businesses 
and domestic ﬁnancial sectors respectively, all divided by ���.
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established for exchange rates and the boom bust cycles of  share prices has 
become evident (again) in the past years. Second, because of  high debt levels, 
the fragility of  the economy has increased. Financialization has encouraged 
households to take on more debt. This debt presumably either has fuelled 
consumption expenditures or was necessary to buy property in the face of  
soaring house prices. Either way, debt has to be serviced out of  current 
income (or by ever increasing debt). Even temporary reductions in income 
may thus escalate if  households have to default on their loans. While this 
need not happen necessarily, the fragility of  the system has increased as the 
resilience of  households against temporary shocks has decreased.
One would expect that this combination of  more frequent crises 
on ﬁnancial markets and high fragility of  households to translate into 
macroeconomic volatility. IMF (2007b) presents evidence that business cycles 
have become more moderate since the 1970s. The devil, however, lies in the 
detail. While “output volatility […] has been signiﬁcantly lower than during 
the 1960s” (IMF, 2007b, p. 85), recessions have become harsher in the Post-
Bretton Woods era than in the Bretton Woods era (IMF, 2002, Table 3.1). As 
output growth (and expansions) was much higher in the Fordist era than 
in the post-Fordist era, the IMF is correct in concluding that volatility has 
decreased. But this does not mean that recession have become less severe! 
Moreover, ﬁnancial crises have become more frequent and more severe 
(Eichengreen and Bordo, 2003).12 The present crisis is not a rare exception, 
but only one of  many in the age of  deregulated ﬁnance.
It is important to note that state shares in GDP are still substantially 
higher than at the time of  Great Depression. Automatic stabilizers are thus 
in place and government consumption forms a sizable part of  value added. 
Moreover, central banks in developed countries (in particular the Fed) have 
been pro-active in reacting to dangers of  ﬁnancial crisis. The resilience of  a 
sizable government sector and (by historical standards) a functional welfare 
state combined with active monetary policy may be the reason why ﬁnancial 
12 In particular Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) report that there had been no banking crises in the 
1945-1973 period.
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crises have so far not had a devastating effect on (advanced) economies and 
why the Great Recession has not yet turned into a Great Depression.
I����� ������������ ��� ��� ���������� 
������ �� ��� ������� ������
Financialization and the rise in inequality have interacted in complex ways 
to provide the preconditions of  the present crisis. The starting point for our 
discussion is the assertion that, other things equal, an increase in inequality 
leads to a lack of  consumption demand. In the period of  ﬁnancialization, 
the increase in inequality and proﬁts did not translate into an increase 
in investment expenditures. We highlight three channels through which 
inequality has contributed. First, in the United States, the median working 
class household has experienced stagnant wages. Consumption norms have 
increased faster than median wages and household debt has increased sharply. 
The property boom allowed households to take out loans that they could 
not afford given their income, but that seemed reasonable to banks which 
assumed that property prices would continue to increase. The United States 
(and other Anglo-Saxon countries) has developed a credit-driven consumption 
boom growth model –and debt-to-income ratios have increased faster for 
lower income groups than for higher ones. Typically these countries had 
current account deﬁcits. 
Other countries have also, albeit in somewhat different forms, 
experienced an increase in inequality. But some of  them have developed 
a different strategy of  copying with the shortfall in domestic demand that 
came with the polarisation of  income distribution. Here net exports played 
the key component of  demand growth. Thus these countries developed 
an export-led growth model. The resulting capital outﬂows fuelled the property 
bubble and bubbles in other ﬁnancial markets. Thus the second channel 
is the development of  two growth models that were made possible by 
ﬁnancial globalisation. It’s important to realise that the export-oriented 
model is also, in part, a response to macroeconomic problems caused by 
a rise in inequality.
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A third channel is that a rise in inequality, more precisely a rise in wealth 
inequality, leads to an increase of  the social propensity of  speculation in the 
sense that the rich households will hold a riskier portfolio. Lysandrou (2011) 
provides more speciﬁc evidence for this channel. He argues that the rise of  
high net wealth individuals has fuelled the hedge funds that cater the very 
rich and hedge funds contributed to ﬁnancial instability, ﬁrst by their high 
degree of  leverage and second by being the prime demand for subprime 
securities. 
C���������
The paper has argued that the crisis should be understood as the outcome 
of  a process of  ﬁnancialization that has shaped the accumulation regimes 
in advanced economies and that has interacted with the effects of  the 
polarization of  income distribution. This analysis lends itself  to two central 
demands for economic policy: a de-ﬁnancialization of  the economy and 
a pro-labour shift in the distribution of  income. While there will be little 
disagreement that something needs to change in the realm of  ﬁnance, 
the scope of  the necessary changes is subject to disagreement. We go 
beyond the familiar call for more and better regulation and advocate de-
ﬁnancialization. This would imply a shrinking of  the ﬁnancial sector, a 
stronger voice of  stakeholders, such as labour unions, at the expense of  
shareholders in corporate governance; it would also aim at replacing the 
logic of  proﬁt (or shareholder value) maximization in many social areas by 
a democratically determined policy priorities and principles of  solidarity.
The second part of  our policy conclusions is even less conventional (by 
today’s standards): wage moderation has been one of  the structural causes 
underlying the present crisis, therefore higher wage growth is one condition 
for re-establishing a viable growth regime. Wages have to increase at least 
with productivity growth. This would stabilize domestic demand in the 
surplus countries and allow avoiding a collapse of  consumption demand 
in the deﬁcit countries. A more egalitarian income distribution is not luxury 
that can be dealt with once the economy has been stabilized; it is an integral 
part of  a sound macroeconomic structure. 
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